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Abstract 
The living conditions and well-being of the middle class are traditionally 
considered an expression of how society is progressing. Yet growing inequality 
and the polarization of incomes observed in Western countries due to 
globalization, the recession and rapid technological change, is leading to what has 
been described as a “malaise of the middle class”. This article presents the 
evolution of the income distribution in selected Western countries and discusses 
the possible impact of the threat created by downward mobility and the erosion 
of the middle class in today's society. 
 
 
Introduction  
Fear among the middle classes, and the threat that this fear presents to the stability of democracies, 
is a recurrent theme in times of rising inequality and economic crisis.  The living conditions and well-
being of the middle class are traditionally considered an expression of how society is progressing. But 
the growing inequality and polarization of incomes observed in Western countries today can have 
corrosive effects. They can create a situation that has been described as a “malaise of the middle 
class”. This is even more the case if globalization, stagnation and recession have a negative impact, 
leading to downward mobility and an erosion of the middle class. 
The sociologist Theodor Geiger (1930) was the first to underline the importance of this type of 
distress – or “panic in the middle class” – prophesying its potential consequences in the context of 
the German economic collapse after World War I. When the middle class lacks class identity or 
cohesion, a negative economic context can generate anxiety and frustration, fear and phobias, which 
can in turn stimulate political unrest in the middle class, including populism and radical extremism. 
This vulnerability of the middle class implies the need for strong cohesive values to avoid centrifugal 
trends and the potential spread of violence.   
The sociological diagnosis for the middle class in Western society today is not so pessimistic – at least 
not yet. However, several empirical elements of socioeconomic upheaval affecting the middle class 
need to be underlined to re-assess the stability of the middle class in many Western industrialized 
countries.  
 The middle classes under pressure  
Definitions of the middle class are a debated issue in the social sciences. While sociological 
approaches are typically based on social classes as defined by occupational characteristics, and those 
used by political scientists are based on belonging to particular social classes, economists prefer the 
measurement of income groups. The income-based approach we apply here allows for improved 
detection of massive, local transformations in the shape of societies, and specifically whether and 
where on the income scale a “hollowing of the middle class” happens (Chauvel, 2016). 
Looking briefly at class membership during the recent economic crisis: the share of people who 
consider themselves as part of the middle class in the United States decreased by 9 percentage 
points from 53 per cent to 44 per cent in only six years (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. The shrinking middle in the U.S. during times of economic crisis: Per cent of adults identifying 
themselves as each social class 
  
Note: “Lower” includes lower-middle class and lower class; “upper” includes upper-middle class and upper class. Source: 
PEW Research Center. 
The general diagnosis of the past decades is that the middle classes have been under pressure due to 
increasing economic inequality and polarization (Gornick and Jäntti, 2013; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 
2016). This is true not only in the US (Leicht and Fitzgerald, 2014), but also in many other Western 
countries.  
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Figure 2. The shrinking middle: the changing shape of income distribution (relative to the country-
year median income=1) in Denmark, Germany, France, the U.K., the U.S. and Israel: Six typical 
strobiloids 
 
Note: The strobiloid shows the income hierarchy as a vertical axis (1 = country-year median). Exactly 50% of the population 
is below versus above level 1. The larger the middle class, the larger the curve near level 1. Many individuals are at the 
intermediate level around the median and their number diminishes at the top (the rich, topped here at 4 times above the 
median, are not so many) and at the bottom (impossible to survive near income = 0). Thus, in strobiloids with a larger belly, 
the intermediate middle class is larger with a more equal distribution (as in Denmark). The Israeli and the US cases are very 
specific of massive erosion of the middle or median class. The dashed line mirrors the left-hand side of the curve to 
facilitate comparison over time. Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, Chauvel (2016).  
This income polarization has led to a decline in the coherence of the middle classes as a large 
homogeneous group in the middle of the distribution. Figure 2 compares the relative shape of the 
income distribution (relative to the median income of the country-year) in 1978/1979 (left or dashed 
line on the right) and in 2010 (right) revealing the changing shape of societies and size of the income 
groups: in middle class societies, such as in Germany and France, a large density or large area under 
the curve (“belly”) around the median would be expected. In this respect, the US and Israel are 
extreme cases, where the stretching movement of the middle class over these decades is obvious – if 
not alarming.  
Conversely in France, the middle class remained stable between 1978 and 2010 (Figure 2). However, 
the skyrocketing trend of housing prices has almost halved the purchasing power of French wages in 
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terms of square meters of housing since the end of the 1990s (Figure 3)
1
. Wealth – and thus home 
ownership – is one of the most important drivers of middle class dynamics.  
Figure 3. Diverging cost of housing (real housing price index dotted lines) and real household incomes index 
(thin lines) in Germany, France, the U.K., Australia, Canada and the U.S.  
 
Note: y-axis: Housing index and household incomes adjusted for inflation, indexed to year 2000 (y = 100). Source: 
International House Price Database, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Data described in Mack and Martínez-García (2011).  
 
The seven pillars of middle class societies  
A more systemic approach to understanding the middle class (rather than looking solely at 
measurements of inequality) can be achieved by incorporating a broader conceptualization of 
“middle class societies”. Drawing on various classical social science works (notably Galbraith), the 
typical middle-class societies of the industrial age that culminated in the Western world in the eve of 
the 1980’s can be characterized by seven important parameters, or “pillars” of “middleization”:  
1- “Wage-based middle class society”: permanent wage earners become a majority 
Well above the level of the working class, a new group of wage earners has emerged with stable and 
predictable earnings, with controlled volatility around the median wage. This wage becomes a norm, 
or at least a typical model in the public sector which is imitated by large companies in the service 
sector such as banks and insurance companies. This model of average wage earners generates a 
pervasive model of wage-based middle class society.  
2- Wage incomes sufficient to live well: the affluent society   
                                                          
1
 Note that the curves in Figure 3 follows the dynamics of the two indices over years, contrary to Figure 2, 
which represents change in the relative shapes net of average transformations. The two figures may therefore 
reveal different aspects of the middle class malaise. 
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In Galbraith’s model of the affluent society, the standard of living increases over the course of a 
lifetime, leading to increasing levels of consumption as well as savings (in particular in home 
ownership). The wealth-to-income ratio is low and median earnings are sufficient for enjoying 
comfort. This is a new feature compared to former societies, where wealth was the nodal resource.  
3- Generalization of social protection including labor stability: the spread of social citizenship   
Welfare state development complements the protection provided by the permanent wage earner 
contract through lower earnings volatility. Major social risks (widowhood, retirement, illness, 
unemployment, old-age poverty, etc.) are better covered by this developed social insurance. In this 
model, social protection is a form of depatrimonialization: wealth is no longer required for life 
stability.  
4- Educational boom and upward social mobility: increasing belief in meritocratic society  
Galbraith underlined the specific role of education, not only for obtaining selective skills that define 
the “new middle class”, but also for the values and identity of middle class parents who measure 
their own social success on the basis of the educational performance of their children, itself an entry 
ticket to upward social mobility. A middle class society is characterized by a growing tertiary 
education sector, able offer younger generations increased educational capital.   
5- Belief in progress 
In the 1970s, middle class societies were characterized by values of socioeconomic progress and an 
optimistic vision of a never-ending search for personal and collective improvement in human 
development, as well as economic, technological and scientific progress. For the US middle class, the 
late 1960s were the climax in the belief in progress, exemplified by the Man on the Moon.    
6- Political centrality of the middle class 
In the context of the post-war Golden Age (US and UK), Miracolo economico (Italy), Rekordåren 
(Sweden), Wirtschaftswunder (Germany) or Trente glorieuses (France), the middle class became an 
increasingly powerful political force. Traditional politics were based on the fight between the 
dominant bourgeois powers and the social critique of proletarian streams. Trade union forces were 
initially devoted to the defense of working class interests, not the median wage earner. In this 
political model, the middle class had in many countries a very limited political choice and often 
joined the bourgeoisie in right wing voting. Later, with its increasing size, the middle class gained 
political weight in democratic elections.   
7- Middle class moderate politics  
Middle class values in a middle class society fit with the Aristotelian ideal of moderation, stability and 
rationality. Due to progressive change in post-materialist societies, the older political balance 
between proletariat and bourgeoisie gave place to the promotion of the middle class as a centered 
moderated actor, an idea shared by Aristotle and Simmel.  
These seven parameters can generate a core of centripetal forces typical of “middle class societies.” 
These forces are defined by a large bulk of middle class members, but rely too on the awareness of 
the bourgeoisie and the working class that their own social destination (or that of their children) is in 
the middle class. These centripetal forces are typical of the 1970s’ spirit where even non middle class 
actors, in the working class and elsewhere, share middle class interests.  
  
Diagnosis on the middle class societies: Are the seven pillars crumbling?  
To date, the “panic in middle class” has not been assessed systematically. Instead, an array of 
potential trends of middle-class retrenchment has been observed by contemporary social scientists 
such as Piketty (2014), Therborn (2013) or Milanovic (2016). As a first step in this direction, we 
analyze here whether the seven trends mentioned above have gone into reverse with the end of the 
Golden Age. 
1- Wage uncertainty: decline in predictability  
The loss of stability in careers, and fluctuations in the labor market, generate wage uncertainty and 
thus make it difficult for the middle class to plan. This creates a new and massive precariat in middle 
class societies. 
2- Wage stagnation and increase in the real cost of life: the post-affluent society   
A slowdown in economic growth negatively impacts wage earners, even in “affluent societies” where 
absolute levels of living are high. People search for other sources of income.  
3- Destabilization of social protection and repatrimonialization 
The model of wage earner protection faces welfare state retrenchment and the erosion of public 
insurance or its replacement by private insurances, with strong consequences for household 
incomes. Targeted and means-tested welfare regimes may exclude the middle class from social 
protection. Savings, business resources and capital gains make an increasing difference in the 
protection of individuals.     
4- Mismatch between diploma and socioeconomic position: over-education and downward social 
mobility 
In several countries (for example in Southern Europe), even highly educated diploma holders face 
difficulties in entering the labor market, generating a mismatch between education and positions 
(nimileuristas in Spain). Beliefs in the intrinsic value of skills erode, and middle class members 
become conscious of risks of social downward mobility.  
5- New worries, declining beliefs in progress 
Generalized distrust includes declining trust in the future, and new middle-class panic.  
6- Loss of the political centrality of the middle class 
Decline in social democracy; reflux of trade union participation of the middle class; development of 
lobbies.  
7- Spreading populism  
Problems that were previously limited to socially excluded groups or the working class spill over to 
the lower middle class. Populist parties progressively gain votes from the middle class.  
 
The inversion of the seven Galbraith parameters is typical of the centrifugal dynamics that 
characterize today’s middle classes. These new middle class dynamics gain importance in periods of 
economic retrenchment, risking a social generation becoming marked by a pessimistic Zeitgeist. In 
Geiger’s model, economic degradation, downward mobility and the lack of a reliable and stable 
regulating frame generate fear, frustration and social disorganization. A strong core of shared values 
and sense of solidarity can limit centrifugal trends but when they are absent, societies face the risk of 
anomie and social unrest.  
 
Conclusion: systemic downward mobility and the risks for Western democracies  
Later social transformations mean that the situation we face today is more complex than Geiger’s 
seminal ideas suggest. The Western middle classes today are certainly more stable than in the 1930s. 
However, they also represent a larger share of the populace, and their destabilization could have 
significantly greater effects. Forecasts of labour market transformations caused by the “Internet of 
Things” and by innovation in artificial intelligence suggest that 30 per cent of middle income jobs 
could be eliminated (Autor, 2015). In the contemporary post-crisis shock, equality and the middle 
class are at risk (Atkinson, 2016; Mau, 2015) as a consequence of welfare state retrenchment, 
declining public employment, restrictive economic policies, unstable housing prices, and uncertainty 
in the credit market, all of which directly affect the middle class.  
The risk for today’s middle classes involves a systemic threat created by the divide between a still-
competitive upper middle class and a downwardly-mobile lower middle class. This threat could 
spread stressors in the social system. The gap between aspirations to upward mobility and the 
realities of economic hardship, political tension, loss of social cohesion, frustration, and support for 
undemocratic decisions might accelerate a vicious circle of economic decay, in turn exacerbating new 
social stressors. As Atkinson (2016) has said, a redeployment of the middle class in politics and 
democracy is the only route to stability.  
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